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DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AND THE LAW OF THE SEA




THE entry into force of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea ("UNCLOS"), on 16 November 1994, is probably the most
important development in the settlement of international disputes since
the adoption of the UN Charter and the Statute of the International Court
of Justice. Not only does the Convention create a new international court,
the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea ("ITLOS"), it also
makes extensive provision for compulsory dispute-settlement procedures
involving States, the International Seabed Authority ("ISBA"), seabed
mining contractors and, potentially, a range of other entities. Implemen-
tation of the Convention has spawned a number of inter-State disputes to
add to the cases already before the International Court. The initiation of
the ITLOS not only opens up new possibilities for settling these disputes
but it also has implications for the future role of the International Court
and ad hoc arbitration in the law of the sea and more generally. It contrib-
utes to the proliferation of international tribunals and adds to the poten-
tial for fragmentation both of the substantive law and of the procedures
available for settling disputes. Judges Oda and Guillaume have argued
that the ITLOS is a futile institution, that the UNCLOS negotiators were
misguided in depriving the International Court of its central role in ocean
disputes and that creation of a specialised tribunal may destroy the unity
of international law.1 The law of the sea, both judges argue, is an essential
part of international law and any dispute concerning the application and
interpretation of that law should be seen as subject to settlement by the
International Court. Although they accept that more specialised bodies
may be more appropriate for certain types of dispute, such as those involv-
ing technical expertise or the application of equity, their conception is
essentially one in which a single judicial body—the International Court—
* Professor of Public International Law, University of Edinburgh. This is a revised ver-
sion of a paper delivered at the Annual Conference of the British Branch of the ILA in
Edinburgh in 1996.1 am grateful to His Excellency Judge Dolliver Nelson for some very
helpful comments but the views expressed here are mine alone.
1. S. Oda, "The ICJ Viewed from the Bench" (1993) 244-11 Hag.Rec. 127-155, and "Dis-
pute Settlement Prospects in the Law of the Sea" (1995) 441.C.L.Q. 863; G. Guillaume, "The
Future of International Judicial Institutions" (1995) 44 I.C.L.Q. 848. See also E. Lauter-
pacht. Aspects of the Administration of International Justice (1991), pp.20-22.
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exercises responsibility for the integrated development of a single system
of international law. The purpose of this article is to consider how far these
fears of fragmentation are justified and, in a more practical vein, how the
new and quite complex system instituted by the 1982 UNCLOS will affect
the litigation of law of the sea disputes, and what the role of the new
ITLOS is likely to be.
II. THE UNCLOS DISPUTE-SETTLEMENT SCHEME
A. The Role of Compulsory Dispute-Settlement in UNCLOS
The emphasis placed on dispute-settlement procedures in the 1982
UNCLOS—and in particular on compulsory binding procedures—
reflects the three central objectives of the negotiations which led to its
adoption.2 It is worth recalling what these were.
First, the Convention was intended to be a comprehensive code for the
law of the sea as a whole, covering all relevant issues in a single text. Sec-
ond, it was intended to be universal in character, a code which could
obtain the widest possible support from States and which would as far as
possible represent a consensus of views. Third, the Convention text was
intended to be an integral whole, a "package deal", which could be ratified
only in full, without reservations, or not at all. Since the Convention deals
with much that had been in dispute, much that is new and much that
remains unresolved, it inevitably represents a complex balance of inter-
ests, and contains many inherently uncertain or ambiguous articles. In this
context binding compulsory dispute settlement becomes the cement
which should hold the whole structure together and guarantee its con-
tinued acceptability and endurance for all parties. Without such provision
the Convention would inevitably be interpreted and applied differently by
different States, even when acting entirely in good faith. As Sir Ian Sinclair
has explained: "What is important—what is indeed crucial is that there
should always be in the background, as a necessary check upon the making
of unjustified claims, or upon the demand of justified claims, automatically
available procedures for the settlement of disputes."3 Thus the principal
purposes of the Convention's provisions on dispute settlement are to pro-
vide authoritative mechanisms for determining questions relating to the
"interpretation or application" of the treaty, to guarantee the integrity of
the text, and to control its implementation and development by States
2. See UNGA Res.2750XXV(1970) and 3067 XXVIII(1973); Final Act,3rd UN Confer-
ence on the Law of the Sea (1982); B. de Zulueta, Special Representative of the Secretary-
General, in UN, Official Text of the UN Convention on the Law of Sea, Introduction; H.
Caminos and M. Molitor, "Progressive Development of International Law and the Package
Deal" (1985) 79 AJ.I.L. 871; B. Buzan, "Negotiating by Consensus" (1981) 75 AJ.I.L. 324.
3. I. Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (2nd edn, 1984), p.235.
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parties.4 From this point of view compulsory dispute settlement is
designed to prevent fragmentation of the conventional law of the sea.
A further purpose, and one of the main reasons for having a separate
Seabed Disputes Chamber, is to ensure that a forum exists which can han-
dle cases involving both States and other actors.5 The powers and respon-
sibilities conferred on the International Seabed Authority made it
desirable that that body should be able both to bring contentious proceed-
ings against States to enforce certain provisions of the treaty and to be
sued by States or by seabed contractors if it exceeds or misuses its powers.
The Seabed Disputes Chamber is thus unique among international courts
in the range of parties over which it exercises compulsory jurisdiction. But
the ITLOS, too, has a broader jurisdiction ratione personae than the Inter-
national Court. Although in compulsory cases it remains confined to hear-
ing disputes between States, it also possesses a general consensual
jurisdiction which potentially extends to other entities including inter-
national organisations and possibly even non-governmental organis-
ations.6 Thus in generally broadening the range of parties which may be
involved in international litigation the Convention can again be seen as
seeking to avoid the fragmentation of disputes, and as promoting unity,
integrity and inclusiveness.
Yet a closer examination of other aspects of the Convention's scheme
shows that in a variety of different ways fragmentation is part of the price
of securing consensus on compulsory, binding dispute settlement. Thus
we face not merely a theoretical problem about the unity of international
law but also a severely practical problem about the handling of complex
disputes within a structure which, as we have seen, envisages significantly
more extensive resort to compulsory settlement. These problems arise
from two features which characterise Part XV of the Convention: the
"cafeteria" approach to modes of settlement, and the "salami-slicing" of
legal issues, requiring a sometimes arbitrary categorisation of different
kinds of dispute, with different consequences for the mode of settlement
and for the possibility of compulsory jurisdiction.
4. See generally L. Sohn. "Settlement of Disputes Relating to the Interpretation and
Application of Treaties" (1976) 150-11 Hag.Rec. 195. and "Settlement of Disputes Arising
out of the Law of the Sea Convention" (1975) 12 San Diego L.R. 495,516; B. Oxman, in A.
Soons (Ed.). Implementation of the Law of the Sea Convention through International Insti-
tutions (1989), p.648; A. O. Adede, The System for Settlement of Disputes under the UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea (1987), p.241; C. Chinkin, "Dispute Resolution and the
Law of the Sea", in J. Crawford and D. Rothwell (Eds), The Law of the Sea in the Asian
Pacific Region (1995), p.237; J. Merrills, International Dispute Settlement (2nd edn, 1991),
chap.ll; A. E. Boyle, "Settlement of Disputes Relating to the Law of the Sea and the
Environment" (1996) Thesaurus Acrosaurium (forthcoming).
5. Adede, idem, chap.9; L. Sohn, "Settlement of Law of the Sea Disputes" (1995) 10
Int J. Marine and Coastal L. 205.
6. See infra Part III.
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B. The "Cafeteria " Approach
The essential problem here is the range of possible forums for compulsory
settlement under the Convention. During the negotiations disagreements
on the most acceptable and appropriate process were such that no single
forum could be given general compulsory jurisdiction.7 The Soviet bloc
continued to oppose any form of judicial settlement but would accept
arbitration. Many developing States, and a few Western States such as
France, would not accept the International Court, but some would accept
a differently constituted specialist tribunal for the law of the sea, which
eventually became the ITLOS. The opposition to the International Court
thus meant that it could not be the only or even the primary forum for
settlement of law of the sea disputes, as it had been under the 1958
Optional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions. Other States, while not
opposed in principle to any particular procedure, did not believe that the
widely differing range and character of disputes likely to arise under the
Convention could all be accommodated satisfactorily in only one mode of
settlement.
The solution, embodied in the so-called "Montreux formula", was to
opt for flexibility to choose one or more of four different procedures for
compulsory settlement under Part XV." The four procedures in this "cafe-
teria" approach are:
(1) the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea;
(2) the International Court of Justice;
(3) arbitration;
(4) special arbitration.
A declaration indicating their preferred choice of compulsory procedures
can be made by States parties at any time and revoked or modified on
three months' notice. If no declaration is made, which at present is the case
for most parties to the Convention, or if the parties to a dispute have made
different choices, arbitration becomes the residual procedure, unless the
parties otherwise agree.9 A simpler way of describing this system is to say
that arbitration is compulsory unless the parties to a dispute have con-
sented in advance or ad hoc to have it settled in some other way.
What this analysis shows is actual or potential fragmentation in two
senses: there is no single forum for disputes arising under the Convention
and there is no mechanism for ensuring uniformity in the outcome of simi-
lar cases before different tribunals. But neither problem is novel. Since
1958 the International Court has decided on their merits seven cases
7. Adede, op. cit. supra n.4, at pp.242 et seq.. and "Settlement of Disputes Arising Under
the Law of the Sea Convention" (1975) 69 AJ.I.L. 798.
8. Art.287.
9. For details see Adede, op. cit. supra n.4, at pp.53 et seq.; Sohn, op. cit. supra n.5.
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dealing principally or partly with the law of the sea;10 in the same period
there have also been seven international arbitral awards on the same sub-
ject. '' Most of these cases have been about maritime boundaries or fishing.
The jurisprudence on the law of the sea has certainly been developed over
this period; it may be arguable whether it has improved, but it does not
appear to have noticeably fragmented. Although the views of courts on
issues such as the interpretation of Article 6 of the Continental Shelf Con-
vention or the juridical nature of the shelf have certainly changed, there
has been no overt conflict between the decisions of the International
Court on the one hand and of arbitration tribunals on the other. The juris-
prudence may not be a seamless web, but it is more impressive for its conti-
nuity than for its discord. There is plausibility in the proposition that
competition has if anything strengthened the jurisprudence and been
healthy for the legal process.12
Judge Oda's fears for the unity of international law arising from the
proliferation of tribunals and the "cafeteria" approach to selection of
modes of settlement may seem from this perspective overstated. It is far
from obvious that the International Court will cease to play a prominent
role in deciding law of the sea cases, or that these cases will necessarily go
to the ITLOS rather than to arbitration. What is clear is that the parties to
the 1982 UNCLOS do have a very real choice of forum in which to settle
their disputes. If the volume of cases grows significantly, and results in
fuller use of the whole cafeteria, problems of consistency and continuity in
the jurisprudence may result. For the present, however, it does seem that
other forms of fragmentation—notably the "salami-slicing" of disputes—
may be more problematic.
C. "Salami-Slicing" of Disputes
The problem we have just considered is one in which the same kind of
dispute may come before four different kinds of tribunal, but in all cases
will lead to a binding judgment. We now turn to a more complex and
10. North Sea Continental Shelf Case I.CJ.Rep. 1969, 3; Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases
I.CJ.Rep. 1974,3and 175; Tunisia/Libya Continental ShelfCase I.CJ.Rep. 1982, \S;Culfof
Maine Case I.CJ.Rep. 1984, 246; Libya/Malta Continental Shelf Case I.CJ.Rep. 1985, 13;
Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Case I.CJ.Rep. 1992, 35; Jan Mayen Case I.CJ.Rep.
1993,38.
11. Beagle Channel Arbitration (1977) 521.L.R. 93; Anglo-French Continental Shelf Arbi-
tration (1978) Cmnd.7438; Sharjah/Dubai Boundary Arbitration (1981) 91 I.L.R. 543; Gui-
nea/Guinea-Bissau Maritime Boundary Arbitration (1985) 35 I.L.M. 251; Franco-Canadian
Fisheries Arbitration (1986) 90 R.G.D.I.P. 151; Guinea-Bissau/Senegal Maritime Delimi-
tation Case (1989) 83 I.L.R. 1; St Pierre and Miquelon Arbitration (1992) 95 I.L.R. 645.
12. J. Charney, "The Implications of Expanding International Dispute Settlement Sys-
tems: The 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea" (1996) 90 A J.I.L. 69. Cf. Guillaume, op.
cit. supra n.l, at pp.861-862.
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subtle problem in which we are required to categorise and separate differ-
ent kinds of dispute, some of which will lead to binding compulsory
settlement, others of which will not. This is almost bound to make settle-
ment of some disputes—especially compulsory settlement—more diffi-
cult if not impossible. The categories we are most concerned with here are
certain exclusive economic zone ("EEZ") disputes, maritime boundaries,
historic titles and deep seabed disputes. With the exception of seabed dis-
putes these categorisations do not have a functional basis. They are not, in
other words, treated differently because some other way of dealing with
them is more appropriate, although in some cases it may be, but because
they concern subjects which proved politically sensitive and where many
of the rules involved are open-textured and flexible, such as delimitation
based on equitable principles. The reluctance of some States to commit
themselves to binding settlement in most of these cases was strong and
understandable, particularly with regard to fisheries and boundaries, but
it does seriously diminish the overall integrity of the Convention.
1. EEZ disputes
These present the most complex problems for dispute settlement. The
practical effect of Article 297 of the Convention is that there is binding
compulsory settlement for EEZ disputes which relate to navigation or
protection of the environment, but not for disputes which relate to the
coastal State's exercise of its discretionary powers over fishing and marine
scientific research within the EEZ. To complicate matters further, some,
but not all, fisheries disputes excluded from binding compulsory settle-
ment are subject instead to non-binding compulsory conciliation. Finally,
under Article 298 States have the option of excluding from compulsory
settlement certain disputes concerning law enforcement in the EEZ with
regard to fisheries or scientific research.
The inclusion of navigation and protection of the environment within
compulsory settlement was intended to restrain coastal State claims to
"creeping jurisdiction" over shipping within the EEZ, and it reinforces a
balance established by Parts V and XII in favour of freedom of navi-
gation.13 But the exclusions from binding compulsory settlement are
equally far-reaching and significant and do little for the already limited
claims of States to fish or conduct research in the EEZ of another State.
Such rights for other States as Articles 62, 69, 70 and 246 do create are
exercisable only by agreement and, in the case of fishing, only on heavily
qualified terms involving subjective judgments about conservation, har-
vesting capacity and total allowable catch. The dispute-settlement
13. See P. W. Birnie and A. E. Boyle, International Law and the Environment (1992),
chap.7.
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provisions for the EEZ reflect the reality that the management of EEZ
resources is very much a matter for coastal State discretion,|jl a point
reinforced by Articles 297(2) and 297(3), which respectively prohibit a
conciliation commission from questioning a coastal State's discretion over
research, or from substituting its own discretion for that of the coastal
State in fisheries matters.
In contrast, disputes over high seas fisheries and research are fully
within the Convention's provisions on binding compulsory settlement.
Thus, as regards fish, the crucial question is whether the dispute involves
high seas freedoms or coastal State sovereign rights in the EEZ. But what
if it involves both? Most of the more intractable fisheries disputes occur
because the stocks in question straddle one or more EEZs, or straddle the
EEZ and the high seas. This is true in particular of the Canada-Spain
dispute in the Northwest Atlantic, and also of the North Pacific/Bering
Sea.15 In most of these disputes it makes little sense to separate the ques-
tion of high seas fishing from the management of fish stocks in the adjacent
EEZ. Overfishing or poor management in one area will necessarily have
an impact on the other. This is very clear in the Canada-Spain dispute.
While Canada arguably has a good case for complaint with regard to fish-
ing of the high seas by Spain and other EU States, and such a dispute is
subject to compulsory settlement, Canada itself has accepted that its own
management of the Canadian EEZ has resulted in overfishing.16 Yet this
aspect of the dispute does not appear susceptible to compulsory settle-
ment under the Convention. The consequence is that the parties have two
options:
(1) make an agreed submission of all the issues in dispute to a tri-
bunal of their choice;
(2) submit only the high seas issues to compulsory settlement.
The weakness of the former is precisely that it requires agreement, and of
the latter that it fails to deal comprehensively with the dispute and is
almost bound to fail for that reason. This may be simply another manifes-
tation of the unsatisfactory nature of the Convention's treatment of fisher-
ies, but that is little consolation for the fish. Nor does the 1995 Convention
14. See Arts.55-75,192-262; W.T. Burke, The New International Law of Fisheries (1994),
pp.59-80; B. Kwiatkowska, The 200 Mile EEZ in the New Law of the Sea (1989); D. Attard,
The Exclusive Economic Zone (1987); F. Orrego-Vicuna, The Exclusive Economic Zone
(1989).
15. See E. Meltzer. "Global Overview of Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks:
The Non-Sustainable Nature of High Seas Fisheries" (1994) 25 O.D.I.L. 255; Burke, ibid; G.
Ulfstein, P. Andersen and R. Churchill, The Regulation of Fisheries: Legal, Economic and
Social Aspects (1986).
16. See P. Davies "The EC/Canadian Fisheries Dispute in the Northwest Atlantic" (1995)
44 I.C.L.Q. 927. In 1995 Canada and the EC concluded an Agreed Minute on the Conser-
vation and Management of Fish Stocks: see (1995) 34 I.L.M. 1260.
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on Straddling and Highly Migratory Stocks resolve the dilemma, since it
mainly refers back to the dispute-settlement provisions of Part XV of
UNCLOS.17
2. Maritime boundaries
Here the position is also complex. Maritime boundary disputes are in
principle subject to compulsory binding settlement, even where they also
involve disputed sovereignty over islands or other land territory. How-
ever, Article 298 allows States to make a declaration opting out of one or
more of the four compulsory procedures with respect to disputes which
concern delimitation of the territorial sea, EEZ or continental shelf, or
which involve historic bays or titles. Where this right to opt out is exer-
cised, an obligation arises to submit the dispute to non-binding concili-
ation unless it necessarily involves disputed sovereignty over islands or
land territory, when no compulsory process of any kind is required. Thus
the first problem is simply that some States will and others will not be
subject to compulsory jurisdiction in boundary disputes, but admittedly
that is no worse than the present position under general international law.
The second problem arises from the combination of Articles 297 and
298. Take a dispute involving EEZ claims around a disputed island or
rock, such as Rockall, and the exercise of fisheries jurisdiction by one State
within this EEZ. How do we categorise this dispute? Does it relate to the
exercise of sovereign rights and law enforcement within the EEZ,
excluded under Articles 297 and 298 from compulsory jurisdiction? Is it a
maritime boundary dispute concerning the interpretation or application
of Article 74 and excluded from binding compulsory jurisdiction under
Article 298 if one of the parties has opted out under that Article? Does it
necessarily involve disputed sovereignty over land territory so that even
compulsory conciliation is excluded? Or is it a dispute about entitlement
to an EEZ under Part V and Article 121(3) of the Convention? If it is the
last, it is not excluded from compulsory jurisdiction under either Article
297 or 298. Much may thus depend on how our hypothetical dispute is put.
If it is misuse of fisheries jurisdiction powers within the EEZ then it will
surely be excluded under Article 297. But if it is an invalid claim to an EEZ
contrary to Article 121(3) then it would appear not to be excluded. But
suppose, instead, that it is reformulated as a claim that on equitable
grounds the island or rock should be given no weight as a basepoint in a
delimitation under Article 74? Prima facie this appears to be caught by
Article 298(1). It is not necessary for present purposes to answer these
questions, but they should suffice to show that everything turns in practice
17. Arts.27-32. Art.30 is summarised infra n.24. Art.32 imports the same exclusions from
compulsory jurisdiction as are found in Art.297(3) of the Convention.
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not on what each case involves but on how the issues are formulated. For-
mulate them wrongly and the case falls outside compulsory jurisdiction.
Formulate the same case differently and it falls inside. So much for Lord
Atkin's forms of action clanking their venerable chains to ensnare the
unwary.1*
The third problem arises at the outer margins of maritime boundaries.
Suppose Canada and France are in dispute over their continental shelf
boundary, as they were in the St Pierre and Miquelon Arbitration. Suppose
further that their dispute extends beyond 200 miles to the outer limit of the
geological shelf where it abuts on the deep seabed. Although it is for each
State to determine for itself where the outer limit of the shelf lies, the
Convention requires this to be done on the basis of recommendations
made by the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf.19 It fur-
ther provides: "The actions of the Commission shall not prej udice matters
relating to delimitation of boundaries between states with opposite or
adjacent coasts."20 The precise effect of these provisions is a matter of
debate, but the possibility does exist of a State making a shelf claim which
does not comply with Article 76 of the Convention or with the recommen-
dations of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. The
possibility also exists of another State also claiming some of the same area
as part of its shelf. Is this a maritime boundary dispute between two States
subject potentially to compulsory jurisdiction of a court or tribunal under
Part XV of the Convention unless either party has opted out under Article
298? Or is it a dispute concerning the boundary between the shelf and the
deep seabed and involving two States and the international community?
In the 5/ Pierre and Miquelon Arbitration the tribunal refused to delimit
the maritime boundary between Canada and France beyond 200 miles on
the ground that it was not competent to carry out a delimitation affecting
the rights of a party which was not before it—i.e. the international com-
munity as represented by the ISBA21—and it confined itself to dealing
18. United Australia Ltd v. Barclays Bank Ltd [ 1941 ] A.C 1,29: "When these ghosts of the
past stand in the path of justice clanking their medieval chains the proper course for the judge
is to pass through them undeterred."
19. Art.76(8) and Annex H. Art.7.
20. Annex II, Art.9. See also Art.76(10) and Art.l34(4). "The phrase 'matters relating to
delimitation of boundaries' emphasizes that the Commission is not to function in determin-
ing, or to influence negotiations on, the continental shelf boundary between states with over-
lapping claims ... It also indicates that the Commission is not to be involved in any matters
regarding the determination of the outer limits of a coastal state's continental shelf where
there is a dispute with another state over that limit. The Commission's role is to make rec-
ommendations on the outer limits of a coastal state's continental shelf, not to be involved in
matters relating to delimitation of the continental shelf between States": M. Nordquist (Ed.),
UNCLOS 1982 Commentary, Vol.11 (1993), p.1017.
21. (1992) 95 I.L.R. 645, paras.75-82.
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only with the bilateral issue of delimitation between the two States within
the 200-mile EEZ. But where the deep seabed begins is not an abstract
question: it can be answered only by reference to the outer limit of the
continental shelf, which itself is determined by criteria which may include
distance from the coastal State. The question then is: which coastal State?
Only a delimitation will answer that issue where two States are potentially
in contention. Thus where the deep seabed begins may depend first on
how the shelf is delimited.22 Since neither the ISBA nor the Commission
on the Limits of the Shelf has any competence to delimit the boundary
between the shelf and the seabed, it may well be erroneous to say, as in the
St Pierre and Miquelon Arbitration, that there are in effect three parties to
this sort of dispute. But, if there are three parties, who has jurisdiction
over them? The ISBA cannot be a party to compulsory jurisdiction pro-
ceedings in the International Court or the ITLOS under Part XV and can-
not intervene in such proceedings regardless of the forum, because it is not
a State. It can be a party, as can States, to a case under the Seabed Disputes
Chamber's compulsory jurisdiction, but the Chamber has no compulsory
jurisdiction to effect a maritime boundary delimitation or to determine
the outer limit of the shelf, because neither matter involves the interpret-
ation or application of Part XI.23 At most the Chamber could be asked to
give an advisory opinion under Article 191 on those aspects of the dispute
which fell within the scope of the Seabed Authority's activities. Thus, if
put in three-party terms this is not capable of being a compulsory jurisdic-
tion case at all: it can be dealt with in all its aspects only by consent of all
parties either in arbitration or before the ITLOS.
D. Compulsory and Consensual Jurisdiction: the Reality of UNCLOS
From what we have seen so far the reality of UNCLOS is that its provision
for compulsory binding settlement of disputes is less impressive and com-
prehensive than it might seem at first sight. The most significant areas
where the commitment to compulsory settlement is unequivocal are free-
dom of navigation and protection of the marine environment. The former
is consistent with the Convention's general treatment of navigation inter-
ests and the strong lobbying of the maritime powers. The latter remains a
novelty among even the most ambitious of environmental treaties, where
compulsory conciliation is usually the most the parties are prepared to
agree on. However, the main reason for such a strong regime in this
22. For analysis of this problem see D. M. McRae, "The Single Maritime Boundary: Prob-
lems in Theory and Practice", in E. D. Brown and R. Churchill (Eds), The UN Convention on
the Law of the Sea: Impact and Implementation (1987), p.225.
23. Art.187. However, it might possibly be argued that the ISBA would have authority to
bring proceedings by virtue of Art.l87(b)(i), on the basis that a shelf claim which does not
comply with Art.76 is a violation of Art.137 of Part XI.
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Convention is once again the need to protect navigation from excessive
interference on environmental grounds by coastal States, so this novelty is
perhaps also less than it seems.
Elsewhere, and especially on those issues where disputes have been
most numerous—fisheries and boundaries—we can see that the fragmen-
tation resulting from the salami-slicing of issues leaves a largely empty
shell which can be filled only if the parties agree on consensual submission
of the dispute to whatever forum they choose. This does not mean there
will be no cases on the Convention before international tribunals—all the
arbitrations and most of the International Court's cases which have dealt
with law of the sea issues until now have been cases of consensual, not
compulsory, jurisdiction. Rather, it does remind us not to exaggerate the
significance of compulsory jurisdiction in the judicial settlement of dis-
putes. But it points also to a further level of fragmentation into compul-
sory and consensual forms of jurisdiction. The consequences of this can be
seen clearly when we turn to the ITLOS.
III. THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA
A. Consensual Jurisdiction of the ITLOS
Given that its compulsory jurisdiction is limited and that there is little
prospect of seabed mining, some critics, including Judges Guillaume and
Oda, have suggested that the Tribunal will have little to do. Nevertheless,
it is important to remember that, although its primary purpose is to exer-
cise compulsory jurisdiction over questions of interpretation and appli-
cation of the 1982 Convention and other related agreements,24 the ITLOS
is not confined to deciding such matters. Because it also possesses a con-
sensual jurisdiction, the possibility also exists of it taking on other matters.
How broad this consensual jurisdiction may be is an unsettled question
which can be answered in practice only by the Tribunal itself. Article 21 of
the Statute of the Tribunal merely provides: "The jurisdiction of the
24. Related agreements under which compulsory jurisdiction may exist include the 1995
Agreement on Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks. Art.30 of which applies the
provisions of Part XV of the Convention mutatis mutandis to disputes concerning interpret-
ation and application of the Agreement or of any subregional. regional or global nsheries
agreement relating to straddling or highly migratory stocks; and the 1994 Agreement on the
Implementation of Part XI of the UNCLOS 1982, Art.2 of which provides for the Conven-
tion and the Agreement to be read as a single instrument and by implication would seem to
import the dispute settlement procedures of Part XI. Ss.6 and 8 of the Agreement also do so
explicitly for those matters to which they relate.
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Tribunal comprises all disputes and all applications submitted to it in
accordance with this Convention and all matters specifically provided for
in any other agreement which confers jurisdiction on the Tribunal." This
can be read as a broad basis for consensual jurisdiction, whether under
other treaties, or by ad hoc agreement of the parties to a dispute, but how
broad depends on which among several possible interpretations is
preferred.
/. UNCLOS and related disputes
Article 21 of the Statute should certainly be sufficient to enable the par-
ties to refer any dispute concerning the 1982 Convention and related
agreements to the Tribunal, including those which fall wholly or partly
outside the provisions on compulsory jurisdiction. This conclusion is
reinforced by Article 280, which emphasises the freedom of parties to
agree at any time to settle a dispute concerning the Convention by any
peaceful means of their own choice, and Article 299, which preserves the
right of the parties to agree to submit to the Convention's procedures mat-
ters otherwise excluded from compulsory jurisdiction by Article 297 or
298. In practice, as we have seen, it is quite likely that many fisheries and
boundary disputes will have to be or will be more satisfactorily dealt with
by consent before the ITLOS or some other forum rather than under com-
pulsory jurisdiction, because of the problem of "salami-slicing" referred
to earlier. Moreover, Article 22 of Annex VI also allows parties to treaties
already in force and which concern the subject matter of the Convention
to submit disputes arising under these treaties to the Tribunal by agree-
ment. Such treaties would include the 1972 London Dumping Convention
and the 1973/78 MARPOL Convention. Both the 1995 Straddling Fish
Stocks Agreement and the 1993 Agreement on Compliance by Fishing
Vessels also allow the parties by agreement to refer disputes to the
ITLOS, the International Court or arbitration.25
2. Law of the sea cases
The Tribunal's consensual jurisdiction also appears broad enough to
include disputes concerning the law of the sea that are governed by cus-
tomary law rather than by the Convention. Although the Tribunal is
required by Article 293 to apply the Convention and other rules of inter-
national law not incompatible with it, unless the parties agree that the case
be decided ex aequo et bono, this applies only to the Tribunal's
25. Art.9 of the 1993 Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conser-
vation and Management Measures by Vessels on the High Seas provides for parties to a
dispute to refer it by agreement to ITLOS, the ICJ or arbitration. The possibility of consen-
sual references under the 1995 Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks would seem to be
implicit in Arts.27-32 of that Agreement.
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compulsory jurisdiction and does not determine the applicable law in con-
sensual cases. In arbitration, and before the International Court, the
parties already possess significant freedom to determine their own choice
of law and there is no obvious reason why a similar freedom should not
exist for cases taken to the Tribunal by agreement of the parties. Nor can it
be suggested that the judges of the Tribunal will lack the requisite exper-
tise to decide cases based on customary law. There is thus no obvious rea-
son why it should not function as a specialised court for all law of the sea
cases, if that is what the parties to a dispute desire.
3. General international law disputes
Can the Tribunal do more? Has it the power to decide issues having
nothing to do with the law of the sea? Although it might be argued that it
was never intended for the Tribunal to be a court of general jurisdiction,
the Convention provides little warrant for confining the Tribunal's con-
sensual jurisdiction to law of the sea cases. It is true that Article 288 limits
compulsory jurisdiction to cases concerning the interpretation or appli-
cation of the Convention or of any "international agreement related to the
purposes of the Convention", but no comparable restriction is found in
the Statute of the Tribunal (Annex VI). There, as we have seen, in
addition to matters provided for in the Convention, Article 21 confers
jurisdiction on the Tribunal over all matters provided for in "any other
agreement". The implication of this difference in wording appears to be
that an "agreement" need neither be a treaty nor need it relate to the
purposes of the Convention. Moreover, even in compulsory jurisdiction
cases, the Tribunal may have to decide matters of general international
law that are not part of the law of the sea, and Article 293(1) allows for
this.26 Nor is there any neat division between a law of the sea case and
other types of dispute. In some cases the delimitation of a maritime
boundary may necessarily require a decision concerning disputed sover-
eignty over land, for example where an island is used as a basepoint for an
EEZ or continental shelf claim. While parties to the Convention do have
the option of excluding such disputes from compulsory jurisdiction under
Article 298(1), the implication must be that, where this option is not exer-
cised, a tribunal, including the ITLOS, may if necessary deal with both the
land and the maritime dispute. If this is so in compulsory cases, there is no
reason why the same should not also hold true in consensual cases, where
the parties may also wish to have a land and maritime boundary delimited
in the same proceedings, as in the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier
Case or the Dubai-Sharjah Arbitration. If they can do so before the
26. "A court or tribunal having jurisdiction under this section shall apply this Convention
and other rules of international law not incompatible with this Convention."
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International Court or in arbitration, why should they not also have the
ability to use the ITLOS instead?
Thus, the broadest view of the Tribunal's consensual j urisdiction is that
it may hear any case brought to it by the parties to a dispute, regardless of
whether any law of the sea issue is involved. It is worth reiterating that
nothing in the Statute prevents the Tribunal's jurisdiction evolving in this
way, nor does the concept of admissibility provide any necessary limits to
the type of case it may decide. While it might be argued that to allow the
Tribunal to decide cases under general international law is to encroach on
the International Court's primacy as principal judicial organ of the United
Nations, the implication of a hierarchical relationship between the two
courts finds no explicit echo in the Convention. Once again one has to
pose the question: if the parties to such a dispute wish to take it to the
ITLOS, rather than to the Court, why should they not be allowed to do so?
The potential does exist therefore for the ITLOS to become a real com-
petitor with the Court, not merely in law of the sea cases but more gener-
ally. Merely because there may be no seabed mining disputes, or no
compulsory jurisdiction cases, does not mean that it need have no work.
That being so, it is important to consider what factors might influence the
parties to a dispute in their choice of judicial forum and, in particular, why
they might prefer the ITLOS.
B. Why Choose the ITLOS?
There are three main factors which may influence a choice between the
ITLOS and the International Court. Most obviously, the composition of
the Tribunal is different. The judges must have "recognised competence
in the field of the law of the sea".27 They may thus have greater expertise in
that area than some judges of the Court; equally some of the ITLOS
judges may carry less weight as general international lawyers, but both
points will depend entirely on who is elected to each body. It is evident
from the first ITLOS election, held in August 1996, that the geographical
basis of the Tribunal's membership and the greater number of judges have
given developing States more prominence than they possess in the
Court.28 This difference in composition might affect the Tribunal's out-
look and the outcome of cases, but this possibility is essentially speculative
27. Annex VI, Art.2.
28. Annex VI, Art.2(2) provides for representation of the principal legal systems and
equitable geographical representation. At the first election it was decided that 5 seats would
be allotted to Africa, 5 to Asia, 4 to Latin America and the Caribbean, 4 to Western Europe
and others, and 3 to Eastern Europe. Judges elected in 1996 are: Akl (Lebanon), Anderson
(UK), Caminos (Argentina), Eiriksson (Iceland), Engo (Cameroon), Kolodkin (Russia),
Laing (Belize), Marotta (Brazil), Marsil (Tunisia), Mensah (Ghana), N'Diaye (Senegal),
Nelson (Grenada), Park (South Korea), Rao (India), Treves (Italy), Vukas (Croatia),
Warioba (Tanzania), Wolfram (Germany), Yamamoto (Japan), Yankov (Bulgaria), Zhao
(China).
JANUARY 1997] Dispute Settlement in UNCLOS 51
at present. The suggestion of different outcomes may also do less than
justice to the influence of judges from developing States in the present
Court and to that Court's general sensitivity to the interests of developing
States.
A second possible comparison is procedural, but here the advantages
are more doubtful. In many respects, including the power to sit in cham-
bers, to hear third-party intervention, and to grant interim measures of
protection, the Tribunal is very similar to the International Court.29 The
Tribunal's judgments are binding in the same way as the Court's,30 but
they are not enforceable under Article 94(2) of the UN Charter. The
possibility that the Tribunal will hear more cases and decide them more
quickly than the Court has so far been able to do is again a speculative
potential advantage, which depends entirely on how the Tribunal organ-
ises its business and the resources available to it. With 21 judges, of whom
all save the President are part-time, it may not be easy for it to act more
expeditiously than the full-time Court.
Third, in consensual cases there is potentially wider access to the Tri-
bunal than to the Court, where contentious cases can involve States only
and where international organisations are subject to judicial review only
in advisory proceedings which they have initiated, or indirectly in the
course of inter-State cases.31 Access is probably the most significant differ-
ence between the Court and the ITLOS: precisely who has standing
before the Tribunal is a controversial question, however, and is con-
sidered below.
These comparisons do show that in contentious cases the ITLOS will
enjoy some advantages over the Court; clearly where the parties are not
States the Court is not an option at all. In other situations the benefits, if
any, will become apparent only after the Tribunal has begun to operate.
C. Access to the ITLOS: Jurisdiction Ratione Personae
As Sir Robert Jennings has observed elsewhere,32 the International
Court's narrow jurisdiction ratione personae reflects a conception of par-
ticipation in the international legal system that is now 75 years old,
increasingly anomalous, and out of step with contemporary international
society. Other international tribunals, including those concerned with
human rights,33 commercial and investment disputes,34 international
29. Art.290 and Annex VI, Arts.15,25,31,32.
30. Annex VI, Art.33.
31. ICJ Statute, Art.34.
32. R. Y. Jennings, "The ICJ After 50 Years" (1995) 89 A J.I.L. 493.
33. European Convention on Human Rights and Freedoms, Art.25; American Conven-
tion on Human Rights, Art.44.
34. 1965 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and
Nationals of Other States.
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claims,35 or the European Community have adopted broader rules on
access and allow participation by private parties and, where necessary,
international organisations. The same is true of the International Tribunal
for the Law of the Sea, although here the position is more complex and the
answer to the question who may be involved in proceedings before the
Tribunal will vary according to the context. Three categories of disputes
must be distinguished.
/. Proceedings before the Seabed Disputes Chamber under Part XI
As we have seen it proved necessary to give the Seabed Disputes Cham-
ber compulsory jurisdiction over the wider range of entities potentially
involved in disputes concerning Part XI of the Convention: States, State
enterprises and private contractors involved in seabed mining, and the
ISBA.36
2. Proceedings before a court or tribunal under Part XV
The procedures provided for in Part XV are, unlike Part XI, open only
to States parties, as provided in Article 291, but it should be noted that the
term "States Parties", as used throughout the Convention, is given an
extended definition by Article 1(2)(2).37 In addition to States, it also
includes those self-governing associated States and territories entitled to
participate in the Convention under Article 305, and those international
organisations whose participation is made possible by Annex IX, princi-
pally the European Community. All these entities are therefore entitled
to be parties to proceedings before the ITLOS, or arbitration. For the
European Community this is a significant advantage, since it remains
unable, even within the terms of the Convention, to participate in cases
before the International Court.38
3. Proceedings before the ITLOS under other agreements
Article 20(2) of Annex VI provides that:
The Tribunal shall be open to entities other than States Parties in any case
expressly provided for in Part XI or in any case submitted pursuant to any
other agreement conferring jurisdiction on the Tribunal which is accepted by
all the parties to that case [emphasis added].
35. See D. Caron, "The Nature of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal and the Evolving Struc-
ture of International Dispute Resolution" (1990) 84 AJ.I.L. 104; W. Mapp, The Iran-US
Claims Tribunal (1993); J. Crook, "The UN Claims Commission" (1993) 87 AJ.I.L. 144 and
1992 UN Claims Commission Report (1992) 311.L.M. 1018.
36. SeeArt.187.
37. See also Art.l(2) of the 1995 Agreement on Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish
Stocks.
38. See Annex IX, Art.7.
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Significantly, and unlike Article 291, this provision does not limit access
only to States parties. Nor, when used in Article 20 of the Annex, is the
term "entity" defined only by reference to those listed in Article 187 of
Part XI, as it is when used in Article 37 of the Annex (dealing with access
to the Seabed Disputes Chamber).
Moreover, like Article 21 of the Annex,3' Article 20(2) uses the word
"agreement" without further qualification, suggesting not only that it
need not be a treaty, but that the parties to it do not have to have the
capacity to conclude treaties.
Herein lies the basis for believing that the ITLOS is open to a poten-
tially wider range of parties, including international organisations, non-
governmental organisations, and other entities which are not States or
whose international status is doubtful, such as Taiwan. Indeed, there
seems no reason why "fishing entities", to which the 1995 Agreement on
Straddling and Migratory Fish Stocks40 applies, should not fall under the
terms of Article 20(2). On this reading of Article 20, access to the Tribunal
in non-compulsory jurisdiction cases is primarily a matter for the parties
to the dispute to determine; provided they can agree on giving it jurisdic-
tion, the Tribunal will have the necessary competence, unlike the Inter-
national Court, to hear whatever parties choose to appear before it.
Views may differ on whether this is a strained reading of Annex VI or
whether it corresponds with the intention of the drafters. But it does make
considerable sense to allow the Tribunal to accept cases which parties to
the dispute want it to hear, even if they are not States. This is already
possible in arbitration,41 and before other international tribunals. Given
that the International Court cannot hear such cases without amendment
of its Statute, and that this seems unlikely to happen soon, however desir-
able it may be in theory, it would be a beneficial advance for the Tribunal
to be more broadly accessible. Indeed, in the case of "entities" such as
Taiwan, the advantages of broader access are obvious, since this would
provide a means of enabling Taiwan, or other disputed entities, to appear
before an international tribunal without having to resolve the question of
their Statehood or legal status, and without any implied recognition by the
other party.
In contrast, it is difficult to see what would be gained by constraining the
Tribunal's general jurisdiction to an outmoded view of participation in the
39. Supra Part III.A.3.
40. Art. 1(3).
41. Even NGOs can be parties to international arbitration with States: see the Rainbow
Warrior Arbitration (Greenpeace v. France). For details see C. Gray and B. Kingsbury,
"Developments in Dispute Settlement: Inter-State Arbitration Since 1945" (1992) 63
B.Y.I.L. 104, n.39.
54 International and Comparative Law Quarterly [VOL.46
international legal system. It could not plausibly be argued that a narrow
definition of access is necessary to give effect to the purposes of the Con-
vention; on the contrary, as we saw at the beginning of this article, a more
inclusive view of participation in the legal process will help reduce the
risks of fragmentation and maintain the unity of international law. From
this perspective the International Court's narrow jurisdiction rationeper-
sonae may be seen to pose more of a risk of fragmentation than does the
proliferation of tribunals.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
IT is evident both that States do have a wide choice of forum for the settle-
ment of disputes arising under the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the
Sea and that the creation of the International Tribunal for the Law of the
Sea has significantly widened the choice for the settlement of disputes in
general international law, not only for States but for other entities also. It
remains too early to assess how far competition between different inter-
national tribunals will promote the settlement of disputes, or whether it
will fragment either the substantive law of the sea or international law in
general. While there is a risk in the proliferation of international tribunals,
the evidence so far suggests that a choice of forum is more beneficial than
harmful.
It is also clear that while in certain respects the integrity of the 1982
UNCLOS as a universal code for the law of the sea is to some extent pro-
tected by the Convention's provisions on dispute settlement, the excep-
tions from the general principle of compulsory jurisdiction are such that
procedural fragmentation is inevitable and will lead in practice to greater
emphasis on consensual rather than compulsory settlement. In many of
the most contentious cases likely to arise under the Convention the practi-
cal situation is thus little different from what prevails at present. Those
who have to advise governments on the settlement of complex maritime
disputes governed by the 1982 Convention will thus find that a certain
amount of ingenuity may be needed to formulate a case that falls squarely
within any form of binding compulsory jurisdiction.
